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Abstract
We reassess Woodward’s counterfactual account of explanation in re-
lation to regularity explananda. Woodward (2005) presents an account of
causal explanation. We argue, by using an explanation of Kleiber’s law to il-
lustrate, that the account can cover also some non-causal explanations. This
leads to a tension between the two key aspects of Woodward’s account: the
counterfactual aspect and the causal aspect. We explore this tension and
make a case for jettisoning the causal aspect as constitutive of explanatory
power in connection with regularity explananda.
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1 Introduction
According to a currently popular view, explaining in science is a matter of provid-
ing counterfactual information about the world. (Woodward 2003; Woodward
and Hitchcock 2003; Hitchcock and Woodward 2003; Ylikoski and Kuorikoski
2001) Explanatory power is a matter of providing information that answers what-
if-things-had-been-different questions (‘w-questions’), as Woodward puts it.
[A]n explanation ought to be such that [it enables] us to see what sort
of difference it would have made for the explanandum if the factors
cited in the explanans had been different in various possible ways.
(2003, 11)
For Woodward the explanatory information is typically also causal information;
his is a counterfactual ‘manipulationist’ account of causal explanation.
[One] ought to be able to associate with any successful explanation a
hypothetical or counterfactual experiment that shows us that and how
manipulation of the factors mentioned in the explanation would be a
way of manipulating or altering the phenomenon explained. (ibid.)
Woodward’s account of explanation, involving both counterfactual and causal
information, is Janus-faced in this way, but largely harmonious due to Woodward’s
(non-reductive, circular) counterfactual ‘analysis’ of causation, allowing explan-
atory modal information to be often interpreted as causal information. The two
‘faces’ are not joined at the hip, however. With half-hearted reference to potential
examples of non-causal explanations, Woodward happily welcomes the possibility
that the counterfactual aspect of his account may come apart from its causal aspect,
so that the counterfactual idea may be applicable to some genuinely non-causal ex-
planations. (cf. 2003, §5.9)
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Others have similarly welcomed the potential of Woodward’s account to nat-
urally subsume non-causal explanations. (e.g. Bokulich 2008, 2011) We also view
as more fundamental the counterfactual aspect of the account. To motivate this
we will present (§3) one concrete example of a non-causal explanation that can be
analysed in counterfactual terms, in close parallel with one of Woodward’s exem-
plars of causal explanation. This supports the idea that the counterfactual analysis
of explanation should not be wedded to a causal manipulationist interpretation of
explanatory modal information.
If we accept that some non-causal explanations can be subsumed under Wood-
ward’s counterfactual account, there’s work to be done. The ensuing separation
of the two aspects of the account leads to a subtle internal tension, the main
topic of this paper. We can begin to sense the tension with the following ques-
tion. If counterfactual information pure and simple—without the possibility of
causal interpretation—can sometimes function as a source of explanatory power,
then what indispensable explanatory role is there for the causal interpretation of
counterfactual information in those cases in which such interpretation happens to
be available? In other words: given that some of Woodward’s causal explanations
are relevantly similar—in terms of their overall explanatory profile—to some non-
causal explanations in which counterfactual information suffices to explain, what
further philosophical work (vis-à-vis the account of explanatory power) is done by
the causal talk in connection with those explanations?
One might suggest that in the interest of offering a unified account of both
causal and non-causal explanations the theory should eschew giving a central role
to contingent features of explanatory counterfactual information, such as the ‘ma-
nipulability’ or otherwise of some variables. Accordingly, the suggestion would
have it, causal explanations should not be seen as explanatory by virtue of being
causal. Rather, the causal aspect should be viewed as a contingent feature inde-
3
pendent of the analysis of explanatory power.
Would it be an option for Woodward to relinquish the causal aspect of his
theory in the interest of such a unified account? Perhaps, but this comes with a
price. For the causal aspect of Woodward’s account plays an indispensable role in
responding to a familiar puzzle about explanatory asymmetries in connection with
explananda concerning singular states of affairs.1 And retaining the causal aspect
of the theory for singular states of affairs, whilst relinquishing it for regularity
explanations, goes against providing a unified account of these latter two types of
explanation, which is something Woodward explicitly aims at.
In sum, there is a tension in Woodward’s account between (i) the aim of offer-
ing a unified account of causal explanations of singular states of affairs and causal
explanations of regularities, on the one hand, and (ii) offering a unified account
of causal and non-causal explanations of regularities, on the other hand. One or
the other aim has to be given up, and there is work to be done to determine which
one it should be. There is also work to be done to explain the pertinent difference
between the two types of explanation that lie at the root of the ensuing, unavoidable
disunity.
In the rest of the paper we explore further this tension and motivate giving
up (i). Section 2 reviews the relevant features of Woodward’s account and his key
exemplar of causal explanation. Section 3 presents an outline of a non-causal,
geometrical explanation of allometric scaling laws, that nicely fits (we submit)
Woodward’s broader framework. Section 4 examines the tension that arises from
subsuming this non-causal explanation under Woodward’s account. Finally, having
taken a stance on how the tension should be interpreted, in section 5 we conclude
by comparing clarifying our position and comparing it with Bokulich (2008, 2011).
1The causal aspect of Woodward’s analysis also plays an indispensable role in specifying the
truth-conditions for a large class of counterfactual statements. But this role in the ‘semantics’ of
counterfactuals can be taken to be independent from Woodward’s analysis of explanatory power in
terms of the amount of counterfactual information provided.
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2 Woodward’s account
We now review the key aspects of Woodward’s account (as presented in 2003,
ch. 5). Woodward begins by contrasting an exemplar of a textbook physics explan-
ation with a counter-example to the DN-model: a caricature ‘explanation’ of why
a certain raven a is black.
All ravens are black.
a is a raven.
a is black.
Let’s agree that this deduction of ‘a is black’ is not explanatory of a’s blackness.
In contrast to this, Woodward presents as an exemplar of genuine explanation a
physics textbook deduction that exhibits ‘systematic patterns of counterfactual de-
pendence.’ The explanandum at stake is a regularity: the magnitude of the electric
intensity at a perpendicular distance r from a very long fine wire with a positive,
uniform charge distribution, as given by
E =
1
2pi0
λ
r
(1)
where λ is the charge per unit length on the wire, and E is at right angle to the
wire.
The explanation of this regularity is given by a derivation of equation (1) by
using Coulomb’s law to integrate over infinitesimal charge elements in the wire.
This derivation is explanatory, but not simply by virtue of being a deduction (in a
model) from Coulomb’s law and the boundary conditions. Rather, says Woodward,
the derivation (within its theoretical context) is explanatory by virtue of providing
counterfactual information: it shows how the explanandumwould change if the ini-
tial and boundary conditions used in the derivation were changed in various ways.
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In other words: the derivation employes ingredients that suffice to answer a range
ofw-questions, bringing out the dependence of the regularity expressed in equation
(1) on factors such as the shape of the wire, the specific charge distribution, etc.
We can see from the [derivation] how certain factors (e.g., the geo-
metry of the conductor, the distribution of charge along it, in some
cases the distance from the conductor) all make a systematic differ-
ence to the intensity and direction of the field. (2003, 192)
It’s worth also noting that Coulomb’s ‘law’ need not be a universal truth for it
to play a role in providing such explanatory information. It is enough that it is in-
variant with respect a range of potential alternative values in the relevant variables,
such as the geometry of the wire, for example.2
We think that Woodward’s exemplar effectively and convincingly captures the
contrast between a genuinely explanatory derivation and a non-explanatory deduc-
tion. We also think that all the work here is done by the categorical difference in the
counterfactual information provided. The deduction of the raven’s blackness does
not answer any appropriate w-questions about the explanandum; it does not in any
way locate the latter within a range of alternative possibilities. By contrast, the ex-
planation from electrostatics readily leads us to see the actual explanandum as one
of a range of possible alternatives, corresponding to different boundary conditions
(e.g. different shapes of the wire). The electrostatics’ explanation is explanatory
by virtue of encompassing this counterfactual information.
In presenting the exemplar and the contrast Woodward makes occasional, passing
reference to causation. He notes, for example, that the counterfactual information
at stake is ‘also information that is relevant to the manipulation and control of the
phenomena described by these explananda.’ (2003, 191) He also states, without
2More precisely, Coulomb’s law is in a technical sense invariant-under-intervention on these
variables.
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any explicit justification, that:
[T]he demand that a successful explanation answerw-questions is tan-
tamount to the requirement that explanations must provide information
about the causes of their explananda, if “cause” is understood along
the manipulationist lines... (2003: 194)
There is nothing in Woodward’s discussion of the exemplar per se that justifies, as
a general conclusion, this step from the demand for counterfactual information to
a demand for causal information. (Call this step the ‘manipulationist assumption.’)
To be sure, the counterfactual information in this exemplar happens to be such that
it can be construed as causal information (when armed with Woodward’s interven-
tionist conception of causation).3 But the requisite contrast to the non-explanatory
raven case gets drawn purely in terms of the mere existence of counterfactual in-
formation, without any further qualification regarding the nature of that informa-
tion. In as far as the exemplar is concerned, all we learn about explanation is that
it hangs on the provision of counterfactual information.
Later in the chapter there is a justification to be found for Woodward’s insist-
ence on the causal interpretation of explanatory counterfactual information. This
turns on the problem of explanatory asymmetries. The problem is well-known as
a counterexample to the DN-model.4 For example, the period T of a simple pen-
dulum can be explained in terms of its length l and the gravitational field g, by
appealing to the ‘law’:
T = 2pi
√
l/g (2)
3The shape of the electric wire, for example, can be construed as a cause of a specific electric
intensity at a particular point outside the wire, so that manipulating the shape causes different electric
intensities.
4Woodward also appeals to the classic problem of ‘explanatory irrelevance’ to motivate the causal
aspect of his account. But the explanatory failure of cases such as the man-on-the-pill who fails to
get pregnant has to do with the lack of counterfactual information simpliciter.
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But we arguably cannot explain the length of the pendulum in terms T and g by
appealing to a simple transform of (2):
l =
T 2g
4pi2
(3)
Yet, if we assume that the (mathematically equivalent) equations (2) and (3) are
invariant under a range of relevant counterfactual suppositions regarding alternative
values of the three variables, then (3) does provide us counterfactual information
concerning states of affairs such as:
If the period T were twice as long, then the length would have to be
four times as long (for constant g).
If to explain is just to provide counterfactual information, then by using (3) we can
explain the length in terms of the period. But surely the period does not explain the
length! The lesson, says Woodward, is that not all counterfactual information is ex-
planatory: in order to explain the counterfactual information has to track objective
causal dependence. Since the length is not caused by the period—a notion Wood-
ward makes precise in his interventionist framework—we cannot use equation (3)
(read ‘from right to left’) to explain.
Woodward’s response to the explanatory asymmetry problem has a great deal
of intuitively pull. But at the same time it sits uncomfortably with the fact—the po-
tential of which Woodward himself envisioned—that in some cases counterfactual
information can be explanatory without tracking any causal dependence relations.
We will return to this tension after offering an example of such a case.
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3 An explanation of allometric scaling laws
‘Allometric scaling laws’ in biology refer to regularities that relate an organism’s
body mass M to some biological observable Y , via a simple proportionality: Y =
Y0·M b, where Y0 is a normalisation constant, and b is the scaling exponent. Among
a vast array of scaling regularities there are some that biologists have found both
impressive and puzzling. The most famous scaling regularity, Kleiber’s law
B ∝M3/4 (4)
relates basal metabolic rate to body mass. Arguably it has been observed to extend
over 21 orders of magnitude. (West et al. 2000) In addition to this truly impressive
range, the specific scaling exponent in Kleiber’s law, b = 3/4, has been a subject
of numerous studies. On simple geometrical grounds one might expect metabolic
efficiency to conform to Euclidean scaling, suggesting for example that b = 2/3
as given by the surface-to-volume ratio. Furthermore, Kleiber’s law is but one
amongst several allometric scaling laws with ‘1/4’ factor in the exponent.5 Whence
the ubiquitous ‘quarter-power scaling’?
In order to answer this, mathematical models have been devised in theoretical
systems biology to derive Kleiber’s law. We will focus on a model by Brown,
Enqvist, and West, not because it is uncontroversial or universally accepted, but
because it provides a significant potential explanation that exhibits a close parallel
to Woodward’s exemplar. There are two components to the overall explanation
provided by these theorists: a claim about the evolutionary history and a claim
about the evolutionary optimality of some ubiquitous geometrical features of life-
supporting networks. The mathematical model relates to the latter claim.
At the heart of the model are two basic sets of assumptions. First of all, all
5Here are some: for heart rate b ≈ −1/4; for life span b ≈ 1/4; for aorta diameter b ≈ 3/8
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life is supported by resource-distributing networks, such blood circulatory or plant
vascular systems. Secondly, there are three simple constraints on these networks.
(a) The supply of resources must be democratic, serving all of the organism. (b)
The final branches of a network are assumed to be size-invariant units: e.g. capil-
laries in blood circulation. (c) The energy required for the distribution of resources
through the network is minimised. From these extremely general assumptions the
model derives the specific, ubiquitous geometrical characteristics of life-supporting
networks and the 3/4 scaling exponent in Kleiber’s law.
In very rough outline, the derivation proceeds as follows. First, the metabolic
rate is related to fluid flow through the network, as the former is proportional to
oxygen consumption, which itself is proportional to the rate of fluid flow. Then,
fluid flow (and resource distribution) in a network is characterised in terms of a
small number of variables: length and radius of a branch segment at a given level
branching, the branching ratio, etc. These variables quantify also the hierarchical
branching structure, and are deduced in the model from the assumptions (a)–(c).
From (a) and (b) it follows that both the branching ratio and the ratio of subsequent
branch lengths are (on average) constant throughout the network: the geometry of
the network is a self-similar and fractal-like. From (c) it follows that the branching
is area-preserving: the sum of daughter branches’ cross-sections is equal to that
of their parent. Finally, from (c) it also follows that the total fluid volume is pro-
portional to body mass, and from (b) that the total number of capillaries (the final
network units) is proportional to a power b of body mass, where b is just the scaling
exponent in Kleiber’s law. From the ensuing equations b can be solved: b = 3/4.
(For details see West et al., 2000)
The derivation takes place in a model incorporating idealisations comparable to
those in Woodward’s exemplar. But what is it about the derivation that renders it ex-
planatory of the quarter-power scaling? Here it is natural to appeal to Woodward’s
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idea that the explanatory power of the derivation lies in the counterfactual inform-
ation it provides. Studying the derivation (within its theoretical context) enables us
to answer a range ofw-questions. For example, it is important that the derivation of
the fractal-like geometry of the network, and the utilisation of this geometry in de-
termining the scaling-exponent, are straightforwardly generalizable to a network in
an arbitrary dimension d. That is, for d-dimensional organisms we have the scaling
exponent b = d/(d + 1). (West et al., 2000) The increase in the scaling exponent
from a corresponding Euclidean scaling can also be related in general geometrical
terms to the fractal-like nature of the network. (West et al., 1999) The model seems
to explain by virtue of relating the actual 3/4 scaling-exponent in this way to the
fact that the organisms covered by Kleiber’s law are three-dimensional, and em-
ploy fractal-like resource distributing networks. The quarter-power scaling is thus
located within a range of alternative possibilities: had things been suitably different
so that all organisms were effectively two dimensional (like the flat-worm), then
the scaling exponent would be 2/3, for example.
In this way the derivation shows how the scaling exponent counterfactually
varies with the dimensionality of organisms.6 But this explanatory modal inform-
ation is not easily construed as causal dependence: the scaling regularity does not
causally depend on the dimensionality of organisms, and it is not natural to think
of dimensionality as a variable that could be intervened with to somehow manip-
ulate the explanandum.7 What we have is a geometrical, non-causal explanation
that complements the complex causal story that explains the ubiquitous evolution
of thus optimised networks.
In addition to answering w-questions, the derivation also incorporates an ele-
ment that is invariant with respect to the explanans variables. Namely, the deriva-
6The derivation also displays the dependence of the scaling exponent on other contingent, non-
geometric assumptions that feed into the derivation.
7The explanandum concerns a regularity that spans a massive range of different types of organ-
isms, and there is no corresponding explanandum for an individual organism or even a single species.
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tion turns on the invariant geometrical fact that for the types of systems in question
the effective fractality of a network leads to an increase in the scaling exponent.
(West et al., 1999)
All in all, this non-causal explanation closely matches Woodward’s exemplar
from electrostatics in its general explanatory profile, apart from the manipulability
aspect.
4 A unified account of regularity explanations?
The close parallel between the two explanations strongly suggests that this partic-
ular non-causal explanation can be subsumed under Woodward’s account. Hence,
counterfactual information can sometimes be explanatory without being simultan-
eously causal information. But if this is correct, then we should wonder what
contribution to explanatory power in Woodward’s exemplar is due to the fact that
counterfactual information in this case can be construed as causal information?
Why is explanatory power sometimes down to tracking causal relations, sometimes
not?
One can have a unified account of the two explanations only by dropping
Woodward’s insistence in taking the explanatoriness of his exemplar as somehow
deriving from the causal character of the relevant counterfactual information. A
unified account would take explanatory power in both cases to be a matter of an-
swering a range of w-questions by providing objective counterfactual information,
period. The difference in the character of that counterfactual information, its se-
mantics, its connections to our capacity to manipulate the world, and so on, would
not come into play in accounting for the explanatoriness of either explanation. All
that matters for explanatory power, it would be said, is there being objective facts
about the relevant counterfactual circumstances, and having epistemic access to
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these facts.
We find the aim of achieving of a unified account of the two regularity ex-
planations attractive. There is logical room for this, since nothing in Woodward’s
account shows that manipulability per se actually plays an explanatory role in the
exemplar, instead of being a merely contingent feature of the relevant modal in-
formation. What Woodward has shown, rather, is that manipulability plays an in-
dispensable role elsewhere in his account, in responding to the explanatory asym-
metry problem in connection with singular states of affairs, concerning, for ex-
ample, the length of a particular pendulum. Unless one has an alternative solution
to offer to the asymmetry problem, here the causal aspect really must be viewed
as constitutive of explanatory counterfactual information. So, a unified account of
causal and non-causal regularity explanations is possible, but it has a price: such
an account cannot give a unified analysis of explanatory power that covers both
explanations of regularities and singular states of affairs.
Such a unified account requires driving a wedge between explanations of reg-
ularities and singular states of affairs. How steep a cost is this? This depends on
how the accounts of these two kinds of explanations can be made to cohere. We
do not attempt to answer this complex question here. What we will now do, rather,
is make a case for accepting that explanations of regularities may fundamentally
differ from explanations of singular states of affairs in a way that motivates driving
the wedge here.
It is noteworthy, first of all, that all the intuitions supporting the causal aspect
of Woodward’s account derive from cases concerning individual states of affairs.
These intuitions can be accommodated by accepting that we cannot explain the
length of a particular pendulum, for example, purely by citing modal facts re-
garding different possible values of its period and the surrounding gravitational
field (since the latter do not cause the former), whilst maintaining that explaining
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a regularity concerning all pendulums is just a matter of supplying such modal
information.
Secondly, intuitions about explanatory asymmetry are fragile or non-existent
for regularity explananda. Take, for example, the regularity that for all simple
pendulums of 1 second period, the length of each pendulum is directly proportional
to the strength of the gravitational field g (as opposed to some other other power of
g).8
l ∝ g (T = 1s) (5)
It seems perfectly sensible to explain this regularity by deducing it from equation
(3). The derivation is rather simple, of course, but not non-explanatory like the
deduction of raven a’s blackness. The explanatory power of the derivation turns
on counterfactual information that does not track causal dependency: equation (3)
brings out, for example, the fact that had all the pendulums in the sample had some
alternative constant period, l would have been similarly directly proportional to
g. Thus, the derivation (within its theoretical context) locates the explanandum
within a range of alternative possibilities. This explanation seems explanatorily
analogous to Woodward’s exemplar from electrostatics, apart from not satisfying
the manipulationist assumption. And if this is not a bona fide explanation at all
(against our intuitions), a case has to be made for this that does not turn on the
manipulationist assumption (on pain of begging the question).
Thirdly, insisting on the causal character of explanatory counterfactual inform-
ation has counterintuitive consequences in connection with regularity explananda,
as illustrated by the following example. According to Woodward, the ideal gas
law in conjunction with temperature T and pressure P can explain the volume of a
8For a more striking thought-experiment effect, assume that in our environment there is a lot of
variation in g, but little variation in pendulum periods.
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particular container of N moles of gas if and only if that container is non-rigid so
as to causally respond to manipulation of P and T . (2003, 234) This seems right
regarding explanations of singular states of affairs. But now consider a regularity
exhibited by all containers of 1 mole of (ideal-enough) gas at 10 ˚C: their volume
is inversely proportional to pressure:
V ∝ P−1 (6)
Can we explain this regularity on the basis of the ideal gas law? Adopting the
manipulationist assumption implies that the answer is ‘no’, just in case some of the
containers in question happen to be rigid. For if some of the containers are rigid,
then we cannot construe the variable V as something that could be manipulated
by causally intervening on P . But it is counterintuitive to claim that whether or
not this regularity can be explained depends on the rigidity or otherwise of the
individual containers. It is more natural to think that the ideal gas law explains (6)
regardless, and it always does so simply by providing counterfactual information.
5 Conclusion
An advocate Woodward’s counterfactual theory of explanation can well try to of-
fering a unified account of explanation that subsumes both causal and non-causal
regularity explanations. This is motivated by real examples of non-causal explan-
ations from science that fit Woodward’s central idea that explanatory power is a
matter of providing counterfactual information.9 The notion of causation as a con-
stitutive feature of explanatoriness is well motivated only for explanations of sin-
gular states of affairs. This notion becomes unmotivated and even counterintuitive
when extended to regularity explanations.
9There are various non-causal, typically geometrical explanations that could potentially be ana-
lysed in these terms.
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Nothing we have said amounts to denying that explanation and causation are
intimately connected, even for regularity explananda. For example, we don’t deny
that (type-level) causal claims are ‘explanatory by virtue of providing counterfac-
tual information’ (Woodward 2003, 205). And it still makes sense to talk about a
‘causal explanation’ in connection with Woodward’s exemplar, for example, to sig-
nify the important fact that the relevant counterfactual information can be causally
construed. All this is compatible with denying that when some fact is explanat-
ory of a regularity it is so by virtue of being causal. The lesson is that the causal
dimension of the exemplar need not be constitutive of its explanatory power.
We are not alone in scoping out the potential of Woodward’s account to capture
various non-causal explanations. But we wish to stay much closer to Woodward’s
own line of thought than Bokulich (2008; 2011), for example, who claims to
adopt Woodward’s account of explanation [but to jettison a construal
of] modal dependence narrowly in terms of the possible causal manip-
ulations of the system. (2008, 226)
In Bokulich’s account of ‘structural (model) explanation’ scientific models—and
even fictional elements in those models—can explain if ‘the counterfactual struc-
ture’ of a model is ‘isomorphic in the relevant respects to the counterfactual struc-
ture’ of the system being explained, where the explanandum exhibits a ‘pattern
of dependence’ on the elements of the model as a consequence of the structural
features of the theory employed. (2009, 39-40)
In as far as we understand the proposal, we worry that Bokulich’s construal of
Woodward’s account is too liberal in its conception of explanatory modal inform-
ation. Even if it is not inconsistent with Woodward’s ontological conception of
explanation—viz. genuine explanatory power comes only from latching onto rel-
evant objective features of the world—we are not convinced that capturing a mere
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abstract structure (‘up to isomorphism’) of counterfactual relations can be explan-
atory. Whilst we also happily jettison the causal aspect of Woodward’s account (in
connection with regularity explanations), we still hold onto the idea that explanat-
ory power is a matter of providing information about ‘first-order’ modal relations
(as opposed to mere structural features of such relations).
Finally, having identified a tension in Woodward’s account and motivated a
way of interpreting it, we want to be upfront about critical questions that remain.
Why is explaining a singular state of affairs different from explaining a regularity
in this way? What is the connection between a regularity explanation and an ex-
planation of a corresponding singular state of affairs (if one exists)? There’s more
work to be done to resolve the tension.
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